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(signed) Herman Singer,
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(Seal) (signed) Louis M. Teitelbaum Notary
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KENNEDY—STYLE AND SUBSTANCE

IN THE COURSE of one week's announcements of current books, it was reported that three were devoted to the first months of the Kennedy administration. These volumes included a picture story of the Kennedy family, both blood and political relations; an analysis, in depth of course, of the men around Kennedy; and the story of the Kennedy administration thus far, the latter just one of the many similar books that are on the verge of seeing print.

It is possible that never in American history has so much been written so early about an American president. The books, along with numerous articles in magazines and newspapers, were aimed at publication on or about the anniversary of the first hundred days of the administration, so that readers would be made aware of the contribution made during the early days. The reference here, of course, was to the famous one hundred days of the Roosevelt Administration, when the bulk of New Deal legislation was enacted.

There is no doubt that Kennedy has encouraged such intense interest in his activities, first, by consciously stressing the significance of the early days of the administration, and second, by attempting to draw an analogy between the crisis days of 1961 and of 1933. Moreover, with television having become such a ubiquitous intruder into public life, there has been a greater tendency of politicians to submit to theatrical gestures and to make grandiose statements for the record.

The Kennedy administration has provoked such coverage because it has been stressed on behalf of the cool and knowledgeable advisors who make up the inner circle of the administration that their greatest contribution to government, if nothing else, would be the creation of a sense of style. The woolly-headedness of the Eisenhower team, matched in every instance by its rhetoric, would be replaced by the incisiveness and know-how of a government of highly skilled technicians.

It is possible that this emphasis on style, so deliberately cultivated by Kennedy and his entourage, contributed toward the Cuban fiasco, which seemed to lend itself to the possibility of a quick, cheap victory, carried off with Kennedy dash.

Disregarding the question of style, although here apparently Kennedy has satisfied the students of political technique that he has delivered the goods, it is instructive to note the progress that has been made during the vaunted one hundred days of the administration. According to the "Congressional Quarterly," which keeps a box score on Congressional legislation, ten per cent of the President's requests have been accepted by Congress, and have either become law or are awaiting the President's signature; specifically, of the 277 requests for legislation presented by the President, twenty-nine have been approved.

The most important laws were those dealing with social legislation, including extension of unemployment benefits for a temporary period, a program to aid depressed areas, an aid program for dependent children, and the raising of minimum wages and extending its coverage. The latter program is particularly susceptible to comparison with the early New Deal.

There is no doubting the very minimal quality of such legislation; the corresponding changes in other aspects of social security legislation point to the fact that the

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high percentage of success is based primarily on the low intensity of the demands. It is also to be remembered that the medical care bill, which is likely to meet the greatest resistance in Congress—spurred by the well-rehearsed anguish of the American Medical Association over its "socialist" character (replete with publicized misinterpretations of the special issue of the "Socialist Call" devoted to medical care)—contains only the most limited medical coverage for the aged.

Since the Kennedy goals have been pitched so low in almost every area, it is not surprising that there have been so few real obstacles toward their realization. The patchwork of social legislation is hardly adequate to deal with the more pressing economic problems recognized by the corps of Kennedy advisers, but still untouched by human consideration.

The contemplated Kennedy program does not include provisions for a speed-up in economic activity so as to absorb the five million unemployed, not to speak of the million additional workers who come into the labor market every year. Automation, whose serious consequences socialists were the first to describe more than a decade ago, has now thrust its way deep into the labor field creating a new term—"structural unemployment"—but no method of dealing with it. Nor are there any proposals that would cut deeply into the raw inequality in income that characterizes the country. In these areas, the sacrifices demanded are not even distribution of the nation's corporate wealth but realization of the potential of the nation's productive capacity. Such demands have hardly been heard, while grants to the low-paid and the unemployed, a high proportion of whom are Negroes, have hardly touched the problem.

In foreign affairs, the Kennedy approach has been somewhat more serious, but the results have been so unfortunate as to make it appear that every possible error in judgment and execution was being packed into the shortest possible period. The Castro problem, about which Kennedy was so caustic during his campaign against Nixon, has turned out to be insoluble in the desperate terms which Kennedy accepted. On another continent, Laos is equally intractable, with all old hands agreed that, whatever the terms finally accepted, it is difficult to envision anything but an eventual Communist takeover. Armed with two such triumphs, Kennedy met Khrushchev at the summit to warn the Soviet dictator to watch his step!

If Kennedy has nothing but spectacular failures to show thus far in his conduct of foreign affairs—although it must be admitted that in this area he inherited a full set of built-in problems from the Eisenhower administration—his evaluation of the world-wide struggle shows an unusual appreciation of its seriousness. In his inaugural address, Kennedy pledged the resources of the country "to those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery," even at the cost of undefined sacrifices on the part of the American people.

Some four months later, asked to make clear more precisely what the terms of such sacrifices would be, Kennedy outlined, in a letter to the editor of "Newsday," another series of minor adjustments in social security and in altered tax rates as representative of his sentiments on sustaining international burdens.

The discrepancy here between style and substance is quite massive. Although it is of course premature to set any permanent label on the administration which has been in control for less than six months, it would appear that fashionable recognition of the revolutionary forces at work in the world and actually engaging in the radical—and socialist—changes needed to cope with them are worlds apart in the thinking and action of the Kennedy administration.

COMMUNISM AND CO-EXISTENCE

THE NATURE OF THE TOTALITARIAN THREAT TODAY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 81-PARTY MANIFESTO*

Erich Fromm

THE "Statement of the Representatives of 81 Communist Parties" (Moscow, November, 1960) is a lengthy document of about twenty thousand words, written in the ritualistic style of all such "Marxist-Leninist" declarations. In order to appreciate its meaning, one must first consider (1) the background of the Russian Chinese controversy; (2) the fact that it took about three weeks of continuous negotiations to arrive at this statement; and (3) the essentially ritualistic nature of communist ideology.

Since the main difficulty for the Western observer lies in the last of these three points, certain general remarks are necessary.

The Communist societies are held together by an ideological system which has several functions: (a) it contains ideas like classless society, peace, etc. etc. which have a deep appeal to men and which thus provide for a certain amount of psychic satisfaction; (b) ideologies become a dogma,

which gives a common frame of reference and orientation and furthermore becomes a symbol of loyalty and political coherence; (c) since the party's and Khrushchev's authority is based on the legitimacy of his succession to Marx-Lenin and their theories, the ideology must be a "correct" repetition of the original ideas or formulas; (d) as a result, certain phrases and words must be used in a ritualistic fashion and changes must be expressed *within* the ideological frame of reference by emphasis and slight alterations of concepts; (e) inasmuch as Khrushchev needs the approval of the Russian top political bureaucracy and of a majority of other important Communist party leaders, he must phrase his own innovations in proper orthodox language and always as the correct interpretation of the "scriptures" (Marx-Lenin). This ideological

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* All quotations, unless otherwise stated, refer to the document as published in the New York Times, Dec. 7, 1960 (italics are mine, E. F.).

continuity is needed as a basis for political legitimacy.* (1) This is all the more important since the Soviet system has, in fact, changed from a revolutionary system to a conservative state capitalism managed by an elite bureaucracy and in complete contradiction to the meaning of the original revolutionary and socialist ideas.

Ritual a "Must"

It is in this ritualistic sense that certain statements like the following have to appear in any communist declaration.

The statement shortly after the opening paragraph: "The chief result of these years is the rapid growth of the might and international influence of the world socialist system, the vigorous process of disintegration of the colonial system under the impact of the national liberation movement, the intensification of class struggles in the capitalist world, and the continued decline and decay of the world capitalist system; the superiority of the forces of socialism over those of imperialism, of the forces of peace over those of war, is becoming ever more marked in the world arena".

Or, "Nevertheless, imperialism, which is intent on maintaining its positions, sabotages disarmament, seeks to prolong the cold war and aggravate it to the utmost, and persists in preparing a new world war. This situation demands ever closer joint efforts and resolute actions on the part of the socialist countries, the international working class, the national anti-imperialist movement, all peace-loving countries and all peace champions to prevent war and assure a peaceful life for people. It demands the further consolidation of all revolutionary forces in the fight against imperialism, for national independence, and for socialism".

And the last paragraph of the declaration: "The meeting sees the further consolidation of the Communist parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism, as a primary condition for the unification of all working-class, democratic and progressive forces, as a guarantee of new victories in the great struggle waged by the world communist and working-class movement for a happy future for the whole of

* It should be mentioned only in passing that this holds true for many other situations in history where a bureaucracy is forced to express changing ideas in terms of an allegedly unchanged ideology.

mankind, for the triumph of the cause of peace and socialism".

I could go on quoting many more such similar aggressive sounding statements, but there is no need for this since they are taken for granted by all who have read this or other communist declarations.

The *Russian-Chinese controversy* is the other background aspect from which the document has to be viewed. Summarizing the issue, the following remarks are considered to reflect it in nucleus:

1. The difference between Russia and China has to be judged first of all in terms of the realistic difference between the two systems. The Soviet Union is the late comer among European industrial nations, which has now reached the stage of high industrialization and mechanization of agriculture and has become the second most powerful industrial state, after the USA. The Soviet Union is one of the "have-states", and despite its communist ideology, embodies a conservative, managerial system with social and economic class distinctions more rigid than in the democratic Western countries. China, on the other hand, is a part of the underdeveloped world, with a standard of living ten to twenty times lower than that of the West, and is definitely a "have-not state."

China a Rival

Having borrowed a revolutionary ideology, methods of centralization and planning, greatly "improved" methods of mass manipulation, technical assistance, diplomatic support and relatively little direct economic aid from Russia, China tries to establish its own new method, threatens to become the leader of a colonial revolution in Asia, Africa and even Latin America. The Soviet Union is in a dilemma: China by herself, as a leader of the have-not nations, is a rival which may become a threat to the Soviet Union (as to Europe-North America). At the same time Russia cannot break with China because this would mean losing an important ally and being exposed in an isolated position to a superior Western bloc. Khrushchev must try to keep China as an ally (which China needs, too) and to keep his own dominant position within the Soviet Union as well as among the other Communist parties.

The objective dichotomy of interests between Russia and China has found political-

ideological expression since 1958: and especially since Khrushchev's visit in Peking in 1959. A. H. Halpern describes the sequence of events at and after this visit in the following words:

"We must assume that Khrushchev on arrival in Peking notified the Chinese leaders that he was satisfied that a mutual accommodation with the West was both desirable and attainable and that he intended to enter into serious negotiations. He probably dictated to them some limits on their future military development. He almost certainly demanded at least a modified style of behavior in foreign affairs and more likely some substantive policy changes. He probably also assured them that he would not negotiate away their interests, but at the same time urged them to be prepared to settle for less than their maximum demands.

"There followed for the Chinese a month of meditation, with temporizing responses to outside events which could not be ignored. By about the end of October, the Chinese had formulated a policy in response to, but doubtless not identical with, Khrushchev's demands. On the specifics of foreign relations, they conceded (and this may not have been too hard) that their method of dealing with South and South-east Asia had been counter-productive, and agreed to make necessary changes. The initiation of a temporarily harder line toward Japan, possibly limited in its objectives and probable duration, seems more likely to have been a Chinese than a Russian initiative, with which the Russians have partially cooperated.

Policy Essentials

"The serious divergencies of position have concentrated on the real essentials of strategic policy. The position enunciated by the Chinese contains important basic propositions. Concerning the nature of imperialism and the U. S. ruling class, the Chinese assert the thesis of inevitable conflict and permanent hostility between the two camps; argue that the dominant American view rejects peaceful co-existence, while a minority reluctantly accepts, rather than the reverse; and analyze current U. S. actions as 'peace gestures' constituting a 'smokescreen for

war'. This position is developed almost to the point of accusing Khrushchev of subjectivism. (empiricism)".*

The controversy between China and Russia developed and apparently became sharpened during 1960, each side seeking allies within the Communist parties of the world. In Europe, Peking's main ally, aside from Albania, is Ulbricht's East German regime, while on the other side Poland and (outside the Soviet bloc) Yugoslavia support Khrushchev; but there seems to be also intense competition between the two sides going on within the communist parties in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The clearest expression of the whole controversy is to be found in an article in *Red Flag*, the organ of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (April 15 issue), which follows, as quoted and paraphrased in an article in *Foreign Affairs*.**

"Long Live Leninism!"

"The article, written by the journal's editorial department, and presumably approved by the Control Secretariat of the Party, is entitled 'Long Live Leninism!' It goes beyond usual official pronouncements from Peking in assailing not merely 'opportunists' and 'revisionists' like Tito but by implication elements in the Soviet Union and in Communist circles elsewhere who favor coexistence and even cooperation with 'capitalist imperialism' in a manner which endangers 'the emancipation of the proletariat'.

"This emancipation, it is emphasized, 'can come about only by the road of revolution and certainly not by the road of reformism'.

"The modern revisionists,"*** continues the article, "proceeding from their assured dictum on the current world situation and from their assured dictum that 'the Marxist-Leninist theory of class analysis and class struggle is obsolete,' attempt to overthrow totally the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism on a

* By A. M. Halpern, *COMMUNIST CHINA AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE*, The China Quarterly, July-Sept., 1960 p. 26/27.

** Peking on Coexistence, *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1960 pp. 676-687.

*** By "revisionists," the ideology, as used by the Chinese, refers openly to the Yugoslavs but in a veiled, yet clear way, to Khrushchev.

series of questions like violence, war, peaceful co-existence, etc. There are also some people who are not revisionists but well-intentioned persons who sincerely want to be Marxists, but are confused in the face of certain new historical phenomena and thus have some incorrect ideas. For example, some of them say that the failure of the U. S. imperialists' policy of atomic blackmail marks the end of violence. While thoroughly refuting the absurdities of the modern revisionists, we should also help these well-intentioned people to correct their erroneous ideas."

There follows the thought that wars will recur until imperialism disappears.

"We believe in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: *War is an inevitable outcome of exploiting systems, and the source of modern wars is the imperialist system.* Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always appear. They may be wars among the imperialists for redivision of the world, or wars of aggression and anti-aggression between the imperialists and the oppressed nations, or civil wars of revolution and counter-revolution between the exploited and exploiting classes in the imperialist countries, or, of course, wars in which the imperialists attack the socialist countries and the socialist countries are forced to defend themselves..."

"Two Preparations"

"So, contrary to the modern revisionists who seek to benumb the revolutionary will of the people by empty talk about peaceful transition, Marxist-Leninists hold that the question of the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism can be raised only in the light of the specific conditions in each country at a particular time. The proletariat must never allow itself to one-sidedly and groundlessly base its thinking, policy, and its whole work on the calculation that the bourgeoisie is willing to accept peaceful transformation. It must, at the same time, make two preparations: one for the peaceful development of the revolution and the other for the non-peaceful development of the revolution. Whether the transition will be carried out through

armed uprising or by peaceful means is a question that differs categorically from that of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist countries; it is an internal affair of each country, one to be determined only by the relative strength of the classes in that country in a given period; a matter to be decided only by the Communists of that country. . . .

Ideology Important

"What is *opportunism*? According to Lenin, 'opportunism consists of sacrificing fundamental interests in order to gain temporary, partial benefits.' And what does the fall in the revolutionary level mean? It means that the opportunists seek to lead the masses to interest themselves only in their day-to-day temporary and local interests, with no thought for their long term, fundamental and overall interests. . . ."

The article then upbraids persons (Khrushchev presumably included) who have minimized the importance of ideological considerations.

"In regard to the question of safeguarding world peace at the present time, there are also certain people who declare that ideological disputes are no longer necessary, or that there is no longer any difference in principle between Communists and social democrats. This is tantamount to lowering the ideological and political standards of Communists to those of the bourgeoisie and social democrats. Those who make such statements have been influenced by *modern revisionism and have departed from the positions of Marxism-Leninism.*

"'Peace' in the mouths of modern revisionists is intended to whitewash the war preparations of imperialists, to play again the old tune of 'ultra-imperialism' of the old opportunists, which was long since refuted by Lenin, and to distort our Communist policy concerning peaceful coexistence between countries of two different systems into elimination of the people's revolution in various countries.

"The declaration of the Moscow meeting of the Communist and workers parties November, 1957, pointed out that 'the main danger at present is revisionism, or, in other words, right-wing opportunism.'

Some say that this judgment of the Moscow meeting no longer holds good under today's condition. We believe this statement to be wrong. It makes the people overlook the importance of the struggle against the *main danger—revisionism*—and is very harmful to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat."

Khrushchev View

These are the Chinese ideological formulations which are the background of the declaration: the text must be understood within the context of Communist ritualistic ideology, certain concessions (like calling American imperialism the worst enemy of the world's people, etc.) to China necessary for the Chinese agreement and the essentially Khrushchev line which is clearly dominant within the context.*

The Khrushchev view is clearly expressed in the following paragraph in the declaration: "Our time, whose main content is the *normalization* from capitalism to socialism initiated by the great October revolution, is a time of struggle between the two social systems, a time of socialistic revolutions and nationalistic liberalistic revolutions, a time of the breakdown of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialistic position, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale." It is important to note here the operative words "normalization from capitalism to socialism" and "transition of more peoples to the socialist position" which imply the renunciation of violent revolutions expressed later.

* The New York Times of Feb. 12, 1961, publishes the following interesting statement from London: London, Feb. 11—Edward Crankshaw, an authority on Soviet and Communist affairs, says he has received a fully documented report on the bitterness of the struggle between Moscow and Peiping.

Writing in tomorrow's edition of The Observer, he expressed the belief that the report might be a deliberate leak by the Russians.

The report shows, Mr. Crankshaw writes, that the Chinese accused Premier Khrushchev of revisionism and of having mishandled the Polish and Hungarian revolts of 1956 and of having sacrificed Peiping in particular and the Communist movement in general in the interests of a Soviet-United States accord.

Mr. Khrushchev, "in his most violent mood", likened Mr. Mao to Stalin, the late Soviet dictator, and accused the Chinese leader of having been oblivious of any interests but his own and of spinning theories detached from the realities of the modern world, Mr. Crankshaw said.

This corresponds to the subsequent statement: "Whatever effort imperialism makes, it cannot stop the advance of history." This statement stresses the non-activistic position putting hope in the "advance of history" rather than (by implication) in revolutionary activity. The same tendency becomes even more explicit in the following statement: "The course of social development proves right Lenin's prediction that the *countries of victorious socialism would influence the development of world revolution chiefly by their economic construction. Socialism has made unprecedented constructive progress in production, science and technology and in the establishment of a new, free community of people, in which their material and spiritual requirements are increasingly satisfied.*

"The time is not far off when socialism's share of world production will be greater than that of capitalism. Capitalism will be defeated in the decisive sphere of human endeavor, the sphere of material production."

Quoting "Scripture"

"The consolidation and development of the socialist system exert an ever-increasing influence on the structure of the people's in the capitalist countries. By the force of its example, the world socialist system is revolutionizing the thinking of the working people in the capitalist countries, it is inspiring them to fight against capitalism, and is greatly facilitating that fight." This statement is one of the most important of the whole declaration. By quoting the scriptures (Lenin) it emphasizes that the success of communism will be achieved, not by violence, but by "force of its example"; namely, chiefly by their "economic construction." The declaration then goes into a lengthy discussion of the reasons for the final end of the capitalist system, which are seen in the acceleration of its "inner contradictions"—the old ideological formula used for many years and useful because it corresponds to Marxist theory and at the same time allows the postponements of serious revolutionary activity indefinitely, since the "contradictions within capitalism" will eventually take care of the historical change. The following statement that "a new stage has begun in the development of the general crisis of capitalism" is in the same vein and repeats long current ideology.

"Peaceful Coexistence"

The second most important topic within the declaration is that with regard to *peace* and *coexistence*. Khrushchev's view of coexistence is dominant and expressed in lengthy statements, of which I quote only a few: "World war can be prevented by joint efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national-liberation movement, all the countries opposing war and all peace-loving forces." Furthermore: "The policy of peaceful coexistence is also favored by a definite section of the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries, which takes a sober view of the relationship of forces and of the dire consequences of a modern war. Concerted and vigorous actions of all the forces of peace can safeguard the peace and prevent a new war." This statement is particularly important as an expression of the Khrushchev position, and in contrast to the Chinese position, which tends to argue that all capitalist regimes necessarily want war. The admission that the policy of peaceful coexistence is also favored "by a definite section of the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries" . . . is the recognition that even part of the capitalists do not want war, and expresses implicitly Khrushchev's hope that the Kennedy administration will represent precisely this "definite section." The declaration then continues: "The unprecedented destructive power of modern means of warfare demands that the main actions of the anti-war and peace-loving forces be directed towards preventing war. The struggle against war cannot be put off until war breaks out, for then it may prove too late for many areas of the globe and for their population to combat it." Important here—again in contrast to the Chinese communists who have claimed that war would lead to the victory of communism—is the emphasis on the "unprecedented destructive power of modern means of warfare," implying that war could be equally destructive for the whole world. Again the Khrushchev demand for peace is linked with Lenin. "The foreign policy of the socialist countries rests on the firm foundation of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and economic competition between the socialist and capitalist countries. In conditions of peace, the socialist system increasingly reveals its advantages over the capitalist system in all fields of economy, culture, science and technology."

The meaning of this is even made clearer in the following paragraph: "In these conditions a real possibility will have arisen to exclude world war from the life of a society even before socialism achieves complete victory on earth,* with capitalism still existing in a part of the world. The victory of socialism all over the world will completely remove the social and national causes of all wars." Here it is spelled out that there is no need for war even with capitalism "still existing in a part of the world." Khrushchev's point, then, is summed up, reformulated and enclosed in tradition and scriptures in the following paragraph: "The Communists of all the world uphold peaceful coexistence unanimously and consistently, and battle resolutely for the prevention of war. The Communists must work untiringly among the masses to prevent underestimation of the possibility of averting a world war, underestimation of the possibility of peaceful coexistence and, at the same time, underestimation of the danger of war."

Ending Cold War

"In a world divided into two systems, the only correct and reasonable principle of international relations is the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems advanced by Lenin and further elaborated in the Moscow Declaration and the Peace Manifesto of 1957, in the decisions of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses of the C.P.S.U., and in the documents of other Communist and workers' parties." And another time, Khrushchev's argument is repeated, both that of "the alternative between peaceful coexistence . . . or destructive war" and of his program for ending the cold war, general and complete disarmament under international control: "Peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems or destructive war—this is the alternative today. There is no other choice. Communists emphatically reject the U.S. doctrine of cold war and brinkmanship, for it is a policy leading to thermonuclear catastrophe."

"By upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence, Communists fight for the complete cessation of the cold war, dismantling

* This is a reference to the traditional socialist thesis that the capitalist system breeds war, hence that the abolition of war can be achieved only when socialism has been established in the whole world. The thesis above is an important revision of the older thesis.

of military bases, for general and complete disarmament under international control, the settlement of international disputes through negotiation, respect for the equality of states and their territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, extensive development of trade, cultural and scientific ties between nations."

The declaration then goes on to affirm again the socialist aim and to show that the program for coexistence does not mean a weakening of the faith for final socialist victory: "The policy of peaceful coexistence meets the basic interests of all peoples, of all who seek durable peace. This policy strengthens the positions of socialism, enhances the prestige and international influence of the socialist countries and promotes the prestige and influence of the Communist parties in the capitalist countries. Peace is a loyal ally of socialism, for time is working for socialism against capitalism." And: "Peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states must not be settled through war."

Colonial Struggle

The declaration then goes on to emphasize that "the communists regard it as their historical mission . . . to deliver mankind from the nightmare of a new world war already in our time."

In a long section the revolutionary struggle of the colonial people is taken up. Here, in contrast to the Western countries, two possibilities are admitted: "The peoples of the colonial countries win their independence both through armed struggle and by non-military methods, depending on the specific conditions in the country concerned."

A good deal of space then is given to an offer to cooperate with the right wing socialist parties for peace. This declaration, which takes up the united front theme of an earlier period, is another expression of the non-aggressive trend of the Khrushchev line. In characteristic communist style the offer of cooperation with the 'reformist' socialists is introduced by criticizing them.

"Communists will continue to criticize the ideological positions and right wing opportunist practices of the social-democrats; they will continue activities aimed at inducing the social-democratic masses to adopt positions of consistent class struggle against capitalism, for the triumph of socialism. The Communists are firmly convinced that the ideological differences obtaining between themselves and the social-democrats must not hinder exchanges of opinion on the pressing problems of the working-class movement and the joint struggle, especially against the war danger." That this criticism is exceedingly mild will be clear to anyone who knows the violence of former criticism of reformist leaders ("social-fascists," for instance, was the ritualistic expression for the German social democrats in the 1920's). Then comes the positive offer: "Communists regard social-democrats among the working people as their class brothers. They often work together in trade unions and other organizations, and fight jointly for the interests of the working class and the people as a whole."

Won't Interfere

Then the declaration goes on to make a very clear promise not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries: "The choice of social system is the inalienable right of the people of each country. Socialist revolution is not an item of import and cannot be imposed from without. It is a result of the internal development of the country concerned, of the utmost sharpening of social contradictions in it."

"The Communist parties, which guide themselves by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, have always been against the export of revolution. At the same time they fight resolutely against imperialist export of counter-revolution."

After these statements comes a declaration which may sound to those who do not know the ritual like a negation of the peaceful line expressed so far. The paragraph reads: "The Marxist-Leninist parties lead the struggle of the working class, the masses of working people, for the accomplishment of the socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one form or another. The forms and course of development of the Socialist revolution will depend on the specific balance of the class forces in the country concerned, on the organization and maturity of the working

class and its vanguard, and on the extent of the resistance put up by the ruling classes," Again the words, "accomplishment of the socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat," are part of a ritualistic formula which must appear in a communist declaration. What is new is the qualification of dictatorship of the proletariat by the words "in one form or another," which seems to leave open all sorts of different possibilities. The range of these possibilities is expressed in the following paragraphs: "the working class and its vanguard—the Marxist-Leninist party—seek to achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful means. This would accord with the interests of the working class and the people as a whole, with the national interests of the country."

Can Win Power

"Today in a number of capitalist countries, the working class, headed by its vanguard, has the opportunity, given a united working class and popular front or other workable forms of agreement and political cooperation between the different parties and public organizations, to unite a majority of the people, win state power *without civil war*, and insure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people."

The only sharp attack, one much sharper than the one against the right-wing reformist socialist leaders, is that against the Yugoslavs, who are accused of "opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist theories in a concentrated form," of "subversive work against the socialist camp," etc. This condemnation is an almost necessary part of the ritual, to get the majority agreement to a criticism of the Chinese Communists, (although more mildly expressed), which is phrased in the classic communist terminology: "The further development of the Communist and working-class movement calls, as stated in the Moscow declaration of 1957, for continuing a determined struggle on two fronts—against revisionism, which remains the main danger, and against *dogmatism and sectarianism*."

What, then, is the main trend of this declaration? It is the confirmation of the Khrushchev position of peaceful coexistence with the West—ending of the cold war, and disarmament, coupled with the assertion that war would not only *not* help socialism,

but would bring terrible destruction to all peoples concerned. This position is in contrast to the Chinese position that war might help communism, although nobody in China has called it necessary or desirable. The Chinese position is represented only in a minor way by certain phrases, for instance, that of "American imperialism" being the main danger to peace, or that war would mean the end of capitalism. The position taken by the declaration is actually in most points a return to the views of the 1956 Russian Party Congress statement which marked the peak of post-Stalin liberalization.

Sees Olive Branch

The crucial point of American-Soviet relations lies in the fact that in the *declaration*, Khrushchev and his majority make the clear offer to achieve their aims by peaceful competition, mainly in the economic realm, and not by internal violence or war. Yet, President Kennedy's reaction is expressed in his first report to Congress on the State of the Union (January 30th, 1961), where he says: "Our greatest challenge is still the world that lies beyond the 'cold war'—but the first great obstacle is still our relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. We must never be lulled into believing that either power has yielded its ambitions for world domination—ambitions which they forcefully restated only a short time ago."

"On the contrary, our task is to convince them that aggression and subversion will not be profitable routes to pursue these ends. Open and peaceful competition—for prestige, for markets, for scientific achievement, even for men's minds—is something else again. For if freedom and communism were to compete for man's allegiance in a world at peace, I would look to the future with ever increasing confidence."

If one reads the Moscow declaration carefully, one recognizes that it says exactly what President Kennedy says: we shall prove our superiority not by violence or war, but by our achievements. Why, then, does President Kennedy assume that the Moscow declaration reaffirmed the "Communist ambition for world domination"? I can only conclude that this view is based on a misunderstanding of the ritualistic nature of Communist ideology: that "the final victory for Communism," etc., are taken as the wish for world domination, when actually they are exactly

what President Kennedy says of our own position: "... if freedom and communism were to compete for man's allegiance in a world at peace, I would look to the future with ever increasing confidence." Both he and Khrushchev express the hope that their side will win if there is no war, on the basis of demonstrating one's own superior performance. It seems that both the President and Khrushchev want to persuade each other to coexist and to complete peacefully, and it

would be a tragic irony if peace were made impossible because they fail to understand each other's language.

(After this article was finished, my attention was drawn to a statement in Izvestia [2-2-61] in answer to President Kennedy's reaction: "Of course we are not adherents of capitalism, but this does not mean that we are interfering or intend to interfere with the internal affairs of capitalist countries.")

WORLD PEACE AND RUSSIAN REALITIES

...SOME QUESTIONS RAISED
BY DR. FROMM'S ANALYSIS

Seymour M. Lipset

ERICH FROMM'S analysis of Sino-Russian relations published as a *Newsletter Supplement* raises a number of interesting questions. There can be little doubt that his general analysis of the nature and sources of the tensions between the two major Communist states is accurate. Abundant evidence also confirms the hypothesis that the Soviet Union is more pacific in action, ideology, and aspiration than China. The conclusions which he draws from these assumptions are, however, much more questionable, and I would like to discuss some of them.

(1) "Communists fight for the *complete cessation of the cold war* . . ." Why should they? So far they are winning the cold war. A real end of international tension, with complete disarmament, and the other consequence and goals mentioned by Dr. Fromm, would reduce the opportunities of

the Communists to expand into other states in Africa, Asia, and Latin-America. Khrushchev does not want war, but he does want to expand Communist influence and power. If one assumes that Khrushchev understands that the possibilities of the United States beginning a nuclear war are almost non-existent, the best policy for him to follow is to hold the West up for derision as a source of international tension, to support peace movements and isolationist movements in western nations, and thus to build the Communist parties.

The peace issue is clearly the best single issue which Communism has in many countries. Why should it give it up? Since both the neutral states and the western states are anxious to avoid war, the more belligerently Khrushchev behaves—as for example his behavior at the last session of the General Assembly—the more other countries seek to

appease him. If you want peace above all, you try to pacify the potential *aggressor*, not the prospective victims.

Khrushchev has a real problem with the Chinese, however, since they apparently do not accept the underlying assumptions of Khrushchev's tactics, that is, the belief that war is unlikely. It is the very assumption of western pacific policies which makes Khrushchev feel free to be aggressive in special situations.

(2) Dr. Fromm tends in my judgment to be over-optimistic concerning the internal situation within the Soviet Union, and by inference (he does not really discuss this matter) concerning the relations between the Soviet Union and the East European Communist states. With regard to Russia itself, there can be no question that the nation has increased its industrial capacity enormously. On the other hand, about half the Russian population is still employed in agriculture, a characteristic of an underdeveloped nation. The non-urban portion of Russia, still the dominant sector in terms of population, lives under impoverished social conditions. The occasional fortuitous visits by westerners to such regions, which are kept off limits for foreign visitors, indicate this clearly.

"Control Mechanism"

The disparity in income and living standards among the various social classes in Russia far surpasses anything existing among the western democracies, except perhaps the difference between rural Sicily and Milan. To continue to industrialize at a rapid rate while maintaining such major disparities requires totalitarian social controls. And to continue to stress the existence of a major possible military opponent is an extremely useful social control mechanism for a nation with a high potential for mass discontent, such as all rapidly industrializing underdeveloped states have.

Similarly, what would be the future of the Communist regimes in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, in a world characterized by total disarmament? Suppose the East Germans or the Poles revolted, went on a general strike with the support of the police, in a situation in which there was no fear that localized conflict might engender nuclear war, does any one believe that such revolts would not have revolutionary consequences? I was in Berlin on June 17th, 1953, when the East German general strikes

and riots began. It was obvious that the major concern of the American military authorities in West Berlin and West Germany, as well as of the Adenauer government, and of Dulles and Eisenhower in Washington, was to end the upheaval as quickly as possible. Western troops and German civilians were ordered *away* from the sector boundaries to prevent trouble, and the American military commandant ordered the Social Democratic Party of West Berlin *not* to hold a mass meeting in support of their eastern brethren. The west's reaction to the Hungarian revolution was similar. Contrast this behavior in Germany and Hungary to Russia's threat to use rockets in support of Nasser at the time of the Suez episode, or to support Castro if the U. S. uses force against him. A world without major armaments would completely reverse roles; it would be the west which would be in a better situation to aid revolutions in the other camp.

Shifts and Turns

(3) Dr. Fromm is impressed with the mildness of the Khrushchev criticism of social-democrats, with his offer to cooperate with them, and with his insistence on the right of the peoples of each country to choose their own social system. He points out the difference in the tone with former Communist attacks on social-democrats as "social-fascists". But surely Dr. Fromm, as a long-time active socialist, recalls the shifts and turns of Communist public attitudes toward social democracy. After denouncing them as "yellow" agents of capitalism in the 1917-22 period, international Communism proposed strong cooperative working alliances with the Second International from 1922 until about 1928; then it turned on the socialists and called them "social-fascists" in the so-called "third period" of the final revolution, which lasted from 1928 to about 1934. This was followed by the cooperative Popular Front policy which even included bourgeois liberals into the progressive peace loving camp, followed in turn by a "revolutionary" turn to the left dictated by the Hitler-Stalin alliance of 1939-1941, succeeded by a renewed effort to woo everyone to the left of the Fascists during World War II. The most recent Cold War policy, of course, has been aggressiveness toward any left-wing upholders of the western alliance. The current effort to cooperate with socialists represents but the latest temporary shift in the interna-

tional party line. The Khrushchev statements about peaceful coexistence and the right of free choice of social systems can be found during every "rightist" shift of the party line, under Lenin and Stalin, as well as under Khrushchev. To forget these repeated twists and turns would be to ignore recent history.

"Rituals" vs. Policy

(4) I agree with Dr. Fromm concerning the ritualistic character of Communist statements, that Communist leaders must speak and write as upholders of certain orthodoxies even when they are in the process of turning yesterday's orthodoxy on its head. Yet Dr. Fromm shows a surprising reluctance to recognize similar phenomena in the West. Our political leaders are also bound to certain formulae. A policy designed to accept the realities of Communist power in Eastern Europe must be presented as a policy of "liberation." A policy designed to sharply reduce American military expenditures must be presented as a policy of increasing our striking power, elimination of obsolete weapons, and so forth. A shift in policy to accept the value of neutralism by underdeveloped states must be presented as an effort to recruit new allies. Surely the actions of the republican "liberators" in Berlin, Hungary, and Suez, are a better indicator of their real policy than speeches addressed to the major segments of their electoral following which expected aggressive action. Our unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek is about as indicative of American aggressive tendencies as Khrushchev's public blasts at Tito.

The real danger, as Dr. Fromm well stresses, is that we or the Russians will misunderstand ritualistic adherence to national orthodoxies as statements of actual policy. I would hope that the Russian foreign policy experts are as good as Dr. Fromm in distinguishing between reality and ritual. However, Americans can contribute to the Communists' understanding of the nature of our rituals by pointing them out.

Beware Illusions

I would agree with Dr. Fromm's basic thesis that the endemic tensions in Sino-Russian relations offer real hope for international peace. The rulers of Russia must weigh current possible gains from continued tensions as against the possibility that the future entry of Communist China as a

nuclear and industrial power into a world in which international tension remains high may be a much greater threat to their hegemony, and even to their physical survival, than the current struggle with the western democratic states. The problem posed by a large number of powers possessing nuclear weapons, some of which have few traditions or institutions to restrain military adventurers, is as much a menace to the Soviet Union as it is to the NATO nations. To survive in a world with nuclear weapons, there clearly must be some control over their use, and there is not much time left to secure a real agreement.

Any effort to make real peace terms with the Russians, however, must be based on the reality of Russia, not on illusions. To believe the Russians are likely to make good peace terms because they are no longer, or never have been, an aggressive expansionist totalitarian society characterized internally by an extreme exploitation of labor, is to reduce the possibilities for international settlement. Peace can be made with a totalitarian and wicked enemy only when it is in the *interests* of both sides to make such terms. And we may be forced to recognize that one of the prices which we have to pay for such terms is to give the Russians fairly iron-clad agreements which enable them to keep complete control of all that they have gained. Whether our ritualistic orthodoxies will permit American politicians to make such agreements is obviously a moot question. Who is ready to give up Formosa, West Berlin, or even portions of Southeast Asia, in return for the end of nuclear weapons or other forms of disarmament? But perhaps the internal tension in the Communist bloc is even worse than has been indicated.

Let us all hope that Dr. Fromm is right, if not in his assumptions about the effects of changing Russian social structure on its politics, in his analysis that Khrushchev's latest "line" reflects the dire need of Russia's rulers to resolve the Chinese question. They may be willing to settle for what is politically possible within our orthodoxy.

DR. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, professor of sociology at the University of California in Berkeley and recently visiting professor in political science at Yale University, has written widely on social organization and labor. His most recent book is "Political Man." Dr. Fromm's article and Dr. Lipset's rejoinder were originally written for the Committee of Correspondence Newsletter.

TAKING COUNSEL TOGETHER

Growing Pains

THE CALL has been issued irregularly during the past eighteen months. Readers have sent us plaintive letters. We're sorry for all this confusion—but we can't really regret it, because it's a healthy confusion. What we're suffering from is growing pains.

We still have, of course, a terribly long way to go. But these are facts: Where we were losing members, today we're gaining them and chartering new locals and acquiring a periphery. Where our youth section was practically nonexistent, today the Young Peoples Socialist League has more than twenty-five active chapters; it has become a vital force in the revival of student radicalism and in the civil rights movement. Where we were ignored by our enemies, today they regard us as a menace. Where we were reduced to a single monthly magazine, today there is a bright new fortnightly newspaper, *New America*, plus *The Call* reconstituted as a serious theoretical quarterly.

Herman Singer

We also have other problems that are not so happy, and chief among them is the fact that we need a new editor. It is with regret that we report the resignation, for personal reasons, of Herman Singer.

Herman Singer edited *The Call* for a great many years, and these were the years when it was a thankless and arduous job. It was his devotion that kept things going during the long doldrum period when, again and again, it seemed that only a miracle could bring out the next issue. Those of us who were associated with him can add that there are few people pleasanter to work with or easier to get along with. It is a pity that Herman Singer is unable to reap the honorable reward of working for *The Call* during what looks to be a happier period, but at least he will remain active as a member of the editorial board, and we are glad that this is so.

GREETINGS FROM LABOR UNIONS

**WASHABLE CLOTHING, SPORTSWEAR
AND NOVELTY WORKERS UNION,
Local 169—ACWA**

**Thomas Flavell, Manager
David Shaw, Secretary-Treasurer
33 West 14th Street, New York City 11**

HARRY FISHER

**Cloak & Suit Tailors Union
Local 9—ILGWU**

22 West 38th Street, New York, N. Y.

**Bonnaz Embroidery, Tucking, Pleating
And Allied Crafts Union, Local 66,
ILGWU**

**225 W. 39th St., New York City
Murray Gross, Manager-Secretary**

**FRIENDS OF THE SOCIALIST CALL
in**

**WORKMEN'S CIRCLE
Branch 1008**

**(Greater East Side-Co-op
Village Branch)**

This space in the May Day—Special Summer issue of the Socialist Call is dedicated to the memory of James F. Carey of Haverhill, Mass., who, as a young shoemaker, helped found the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union. Elected to the Massachusetts legislature as a Socialist in the early years of this century, he was a great orator and debater. I heard him speak many times, and always with profit and pleasure.

John P. Burke, President Secretary,

International Brotherhood of Pulp and Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers

OPENING THE ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM IN COMMUNIST LANDS

**PERSISTENT AND PERMANENT CHARACTER OF
SOCIALIST OPPOSITION BEHIND IRON CURTAIN**

Zygmunt Zaremba

SINCE THE TIME of the turning point in Poland, and of the tragic uprising of the Hungarian people in 1955, slogans of struggle with "revisionism" have resounded throughout the whole Communist camp. In "revisionism," which permeates the rank and file of all Communist parties, the leaders of those parties see their greatest danger. "Revisionism" has become enemy number one and has created an even greater threat than that which, until 1956, Communist propaganda saw as emanating from "imperialistic" intrigues and "capitalistic encirclement."

In the history of Communism there has been no lack of varied "deviations" and more or less definite heresies. Their existence was short-lived and frequently only fictitious, resulting from police provocation in an endeavor to justify the successive waves of terror in the U.S.S.R. The phenomenon to which official Communist propaganda gave the name of "revisionism" is something more than a deviation of a certain person or group from the line laid down by the party. The persistent counter-attacks against "revisionism" as well as the duration of the phenomenon bear witness to that. Evidently it has planted its roots firmly in the camp which has so far boasted of its monolithic ideology and organization. It also does not

appear that the development of this so-called "revisionism" can be contained by administrative measures and propaganda, or even by terror.

Called "Revisionism"

Official Communist propaganda has given the name of "revisionism" to all opposition movements arising within the countries under Communist rule as well as in the vassal parties of the West, in order to disgrace these movements in the eyes of party members, brought up on a simplified and deformed Marxism, by identifying these movements with the opportunistic trends which were current at the end of the last century. On the other hand, this name was also intended to reduce the question to the dimensions of an episode in the internal life of particular parties. In fact, however, Communist "revisionism" has nothing in common with Bernstein's revisionism; it is marked rather

ZYGMUNT ZAREMBA, chairman of the Polish Socialist Party in Exile, also heads the Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe. His discussion of "revisionism" and resistance in the European Communist states is the first of a series of studies of Socialist alternatives to the "Communist distortions of the basic ideals of Socialism."

by a return to classical Marxism. By the very fact that in the countries of Communist dictatorship the Communist party is the only instrument of political activity, opposition within that party, when it assumes a concrete and similar ideological form everywhere despite differing local conditions, has a significance which goes far beyond the party framework, and becomes an expression of trends which are developing within the whole society.

To undertake, therefore, the task of explaining the phenomenon which is now known as "revisionism," we have to seek its origin in the opposition of social and political forces which exist and manifest themselves in the countries of Communist dictatorship. Signs of "revisionism" have appeared most sharply in the countries of the so-called people's democracy. Their connection with the spontaneous resistance against regimes imposed from without, and with the failure of all attempts to export the Communist system by means of terror and administrative measures (which were closely linked with consolidating a specific Soviet neo-colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe) is quite clear.

AGAINST DICTATORSHIP

1. Spontaneous Resistance

Social and economic changes, despite their revolutionary character, have not evoked in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe any significant resistance by defined social forces. Outbreak of guerrilla warfare and terroristic action during the first few years after the new regimes had been imposed were caused by injury to national feelings and not by conflict of class interests. Undoubtedly these outbreaks were stimulated in many instances by people who lived in the past and could not come to terms with the revolution taking place in agrarian and industrial relations. But the battle-cry which called people to the forests, and above all the youth engaged previously in the independence struggle against Hitlerism, were the words of protest against the puppet governments, wholly obedient to the will of the Kremlin and imposed upon their people by the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

Agrarian reform, by taking land from large estate owners, removed one of the social malaises which had been the subject of a long and bitter internal struggle. Land-

owners constituted a class destined to disappear. This reform could not, therefore, evoke a reaction from the broad masses, and the landowners themselves were not strong enough to resist the distribution of their land among the peasants.

A similar situation arose in regard to the class of industrialists, the more so in that the war had deprived them of industrial management, which had passed into the hands of the Hitlerian occupant. The takeover by the state of the industrial concerns was, therefore, carried out without any sign of protest. The working class, which in many cases assumed managerial responsibility in the deserted plants and factories and resumed production on its own initiative, did not display the slightest intention of facilitating the return of industry to its former owners. This attitude was fortified by the fact that many of the former owners had left the worst possible record in the memory of the workers.

Passive Acceptance

Yet almost as soon as the new governments, constituted under the pressure of the U.S.S.R. and its military and security organs, were set up in the countries of the hitherto independent nations, anxiety about national independence was aroused; and as time went on a feeling of injustice and of a new exploitation—this time by the U.S.S.R.—grew stronger and stronger. But all the evil that came with the new regime, and all the evil that might follow, had no comparison with the hell which had been created by the war and Hitler's occupation. Any change could only have been for the better; it was naturally assumed that it would bring to an end the art of manslaughter perfected by the Nazis, and ease daily human sufferings.

Thus, while the Soviet terror was systematically destroying all centres of potential resistance by the shooting of hundreds of people and the sending of thousands more to prisons and camps, the establishment of the new regime was effected—under Soviet protection—in conditions of passive acceptance by the masses and resigned surrender by the national communities concerned. Where, however, organised Socialist and peasant forces, as for example in Czechoslovakia and Poland, endeavored to oppose the establishment of dictatorship by the Communist parties in a constitutional way and in accordance with democratic principles—

said to have been guaranteed by the Yalta agreement—these oppositions were crushed by the combined forces of the N.K.V.D. and the internal Communist security police, already in the second year of the new order.

Relentless Resistance

The despondency of the people, augmented by a feeling of being left to face the whole Soviet might alone, and the apathy of the masses towards the excesses of the new rulers, did not mean, however, that their power was given even the slightest degree of approval. From the first moment that the Communists took control of the life of the Central and East European nations, there began to grow a silent, spontaneous resistance, which was rejecting everything introduced by the new order. The rulers were surrounded by a general hostility which was changing into hatred. But the Communists were in office, and the life of a community without a government is impossible. Thus emerged a relationship of marked duality between the government and the community: On the one hand the governed showed tolerance and even cooperation in the field of tasks essential to national life, as, for instance, reconstruction of the war-ravaged economy and establishment of an efficient network of local government. On the other hand, a relentless resistance was evident, increasing in intensity with each attempt by the rulers to indoctrinate the people with their ideology, and especially against any move aimed at identifying the Central and East European nations in all respects with the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and attempting to prepare for their inclusion in the network of the Soviet empire.

This resistance—scattered, individualistic, and practiced according to the potentiality of each citizen—prevented the idea of Communist governments from taking firm roots in the minds of the masses, and left those governments on the fringe of the real life of the nations they governed. As a result, the life of the individual nations developed along two parallel levels. One, the official, gave semblance of the unlimited power of the Communists, having at their disposal powerful organisations with millions of seemingly disciplined members, ready—on order—to manifest their enthusiasm for each measure taken by the rulers. The other, an unofficial one, and so much more important, was full of hatred for the imposed system

and of growing determination to oppose it everywhere, wherever the arm of the security police could not prevent it.

After the suppression of all organised centres not subject to the direct control of the Communist parties, the Church and the family became the focal centres of spontaneous—frequently negative—resistance. They were subjected to incessant attacks by the Communists. A system of low wages was forcing women to seek gainful employment in order to supplement the meagre incomes of the family breadwinners. Mass youth and children's organizations were carrying out an intensive indoctrination of the new generation, and, by instilling into young minds an attitude of hostility towards their "conservative" parents, endeavored to break family ties. There was even no lack of attempts to raise to the dignity of virtue ordinary denunciation by children of their families. Such methods brought partial success in the U.S.S.R. during the peak period of Stalinist terror, but they did not bring the results desired by the Communists in the countries of "people's democracy". Youth organisations, although they attracted vast numbers as a result of privileges and facilities showered on their members, did not, in fact, cause any deeper discords than those which exist between the old and the younger generation anywhere in the world.

Negative Reaction

The campaign against religion and the Church produced no better results, either. This is particularly evident where the Roman Catholic Church is involved, which has her own hierarchy to a large extent independent from the State. The Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R., despite official encouragement of atheism, even regained a certain importance in the life of the state, and today her dignitaries, jointly with the party "elite", participate in official state celebrations. In a Catholic State, as for example Poland, something occurred that was contrary to what the Communists expected when they embarked upon a guerilla war against religious belief and the Church. There, even those who were indifferent to religion supported the attacked Church. Churches were filled not only by the faithful but also by the atheists; participants found there a place for the collective expression of national solidarity and for displaying their opposition to the ideology and methods of government

imported in replica from the Soviet Union.

The strains of resistance which were growing and spreading during the first few years of the establishment of Communist power had, however, only a negative character. The stormy process of change, by reshuffling vast masses of the population, systematically proletarianized and pauperized, and by placing each and all in new conditions of life, was delaying ideological crystallization within the community. Owing to the fact that the working people were wholly preoccupied with earning a living, invariably necessitating a continual search for additional employment in order to supplement the family budget and in many cases even the budget of the individual, the creation of joint opinion which would define collective desires and objectives was extremely difficult. A certain stabilization in internal relations appears to show itself for the first time in the early 'fifties. A definite composition of social forces begins to evolve. At the same time, from the universal but scattered and frequently negative resistance, clear-cut collective appraisals of the real situation emerge, and joint ideas as to what had to be changed, and how, so that the conditions of life might become better. Thus the general discontent began to form itself into clearly defined ideological movements.

2. Crystallisation of Social Forces

One of the significant features observable during the first period of the formation of internal relations in the countries of the so-called "people's democracy" was the removal from public life, as an independent factor, of the working class, which before the war and during the period of occupation had played the most dynamic part. This fact created an impression that the working class had yielded to the pressure of Communist propaganda which argued in terms of Socialist phraseology. So long, however, as the workers were relatively free to speak their mind and to demonstrate their will, they decisively opposed the methods of the new power—by assuming an explicitly hostile attitude and by attempting to show their class solidarity in the face of the barbaric exploitation introduced by the Communist governments. In Poland, free elections to Workers' Councils in the years 1945-7 resulted, as a rule, in the defeat of the Communist candidates. But the suppression of independent workers' organizations, and,

still more, a sudden large influx to industry of new, inexperienced proletarians, paralysed the working class. The old core of the labor movement was inundated by people of peasant or petit bourgeois origin who had neither any tradition of working-class solidarity nor a working-class vision of a better world.

This weakening of the working class enabled the Communists to carry out, without any serious difficulty, an anti-workers' policy of quick accumulation of capital. Ruthless exploitation of the working people was bound to evoke and to accelerate a fusion between the new and the old proletarian strata; and the former began to learn from the latter appraisals of the reality as well as the picture of a desired future. Together with this levelling up of the ideological front, a spirit of solidarity among the workers began to grow again, the only weapon with which the worker can resist exploitation by the new managers of capital and the means of production. Working-class resistance, which, until now, had been silent and individualistic, expressing itself in such forms as a spontaneous fluidity of labor force in particular factories, or widespread and unjustified absenteeism, began now to appear as a concrete collective current of will and action. The revolutionary outbreak of East Berlin and the mass demonstrations of workers in Czechoslovakia (1953), the bloody manifestations in Poznan, and then the Polish October and the Hungarian revolution (1956) mark a return to the public scene of the working class as the most dynamic element in the life of the communities.

Changes in the second sector of mass concentration of the population—in the country—took a somewhat different trend. Here, too, as with the workers, the governments adopted a policy of ruthless exploitation. Compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce at staggeringly low prices, and the fixing of prices for the products supplied by the peasants without due consideration of the costs of production, were designed to achieve the same objective in agriculture as the policy of starvation wages in industry. Moreover, the Communist governments attacked the very principle of the agricultural system based on individual peasant small-holdings, by endeavoring to push the peasants into the so-called collective cooperatives set up on the pattern of Soviet collective farms (Kolkhozes). In Communist propaganda this step meant to mark a transition to a "more efficient" form of agricultural pro-

duction, whereas in reality the objective of this policy was to proletarianize the peasantry, subject it to a strict party and government control, thereby depriving the peasants of all economic independence and consequently disarming a powerful source of opposition to the new system.

Reaction of Peasants

As a class the peasantry, by the very nature of its social and economic character, has weak internal ties. The peasants are scattered over large areas; life in small communities makes collective action difficult and under a dictatorial system almost impossible. These circumstances helped the Communists in carrying out the intended objective. None the less, a strong attachment to their plots of land, and the independence derived therefrom, became a source of the peasants' stubborn resistance to the imposed changes. It could, however, express itself only through individual acts of opposition to the pressure exerted by the administrative authorities; by a lowering of agricultural output resulting from a disruption of the normal rhythm of work and the destruction of initiative and good husbandry; and also by refraining from joining the producers' cooperatives which were set up everywhere.

This resistance prolonged the process of squeezing the peasants into the Kolkhozes, and consequently brought about a chronic shortage of agricultural produce. In view of this, the Communist governments in the two largest countries of "people's democracy"—Poland and Yugoslavia—were compelled to renounce their agricultural policy based on the Soviet pattern of complete collectivization, and allow the peasants to return to a relatively free individualistic economy. In the other countries there is a considerable degree of collectivization, but the peasants' resistance to the imposed system can be felt everywhere. Recently Czechoslovakia disclosed a substantial deficiency in her agricultural economy, which is to a large extent collectivized, and the underlying causes of the publicized difficulties should be sought in the peasants' opposition to collectivization.

The class of intellectual workers, whose numbers have increased as rapidly as those of the industrial workers, presents a specific and more diverse sector of opposition. Administrative and party control over this class is more direct and effective than that

which can be exercised over workers or peasants. Many intellectual workers, who occupy managerial or supervisory posts even if they themselves are not party members, are closely linked with the ruling bureaucracy, wholly subordinate to the Communist party. It would seem, therefore, that this class is the least likely to create opposition. It is also this class that is most exposed to the temptations of opportunism; the overwhelmingly large number of intellectual workers who belong to the Communist parties, as compared with industrial workers, is sufficient proof of that. In reality, however, within this class, too, there is an almost universal feeling of opposition, which on many occasions assumes unusual and effective forms.

Intellectual workers, accustomed to critical thinking, notice and react sharply to ideological contradictions and social antagonisms so abundant in life under Communist rule. They have no desire for a return to a capitalist pattern of society, but in no way can they accept the existing system as a realization of Socialist principles. This class, formed largely of people descended from workers or peasants, not only does not break its ties with the social classes of its origin, but also shares with them a feeling of solidarity. Thus all attempts to transform it into a ruling class have either completely failed or are reaching only an initial stage of success.

Intellectual's Role

Among the circles of intellectual workers, two factors play an important part: a strongly developed patriotism and a feeling of humiliation arising from the necessity for continual subordination of the interests of their own nations to the interests of the U.S.S.R. The eagerness of Soviet representatives to act as constant advisers, exacting of course handsome rewards for the "advice" and "assistance" rendered, has played an important part in deepening and spreading these feelings. The signs of exploitation and control of their countries by the U.S.S.R. are more easily noticeable by the intellectual workers because the government's decisions—often deeply contrary to the concept of social and national interests—pass through their hands. It is easier for them than for any other section of the community to detect that the source of all such decisions is Soviet power. The awareness of this fact does not, however, remain confined to the

circles of the intellectual workers but quickly spreads to all other sections of society. Such an attitude on the part of the intellectual class exerts a considerable influence on the shaping of public opinion, and frequently forms a very effective barrier against the Communist authorities in their endeavors to carry out Soviet orders.

Socialism Gains

Processes of the development of definite social forces are always synonymous with the crystallization of definite ideologies. As soon as the original resistance to the imposed system found firm ground in the reshaped working class, it had to assume an ideological expression consistent with the objectives of that class. The revolutionary outbreaks which have taken place in the countries of "people's democracy," and numerous demonstrations in the U.S.S.R. itself, have shown clearly enough that the ideological character of the whole resistance movement is shaped by the working class. It has, beyond any doubt, a Socialist and democratic character. The intellectual workers and the "intelligentsia" accept these ideological tenets without any internal dissensions. The conception of democratic Socialism assures the peasants of freedom to return to an agricultural system based on individual economy. The peasants understand, therefore, the need for close cooperation with the workers and have no reason whatever to oppose their conception of how to solve the problems which have arisen from the conditions of life created during fifteen years of Communist dictatorship. This conception fully satisfies the national as well as the economic and social needs of all sections of the community.

From the moment the working class reappears on the scene of public life, all negative reactions, whether of an emotional, moral, or religious character, demonstrated previously by particular individuals, assume the significance of opposition which, quite naturally, seeks political expression. It is true that it is still too early for this opposition to take organized form, but the fact remains that now not only the family and the Church can be the centres of these feelings and aspirations, but also each workshop and mine, each factory and office, becomes the focal point of similar endeavors. These changes cannot remain without influence upon the course of life in general, and still

more upon the formation of views within the Communist parties, the only political centres which are organized. As a result of these very same changes, a phenomenon has arisen which may have historical importance: in all countries subjected to Communist power, an internal opposition, called "revisionism," has emerged within the ruling parties.

REVISIONISM FROM ABOVE

The revolutionary process steered by the iron hand of Stalin led in the Soviet Union to the creation of a truly new ruling class. This class enjoyed all possible privileges of power and well-being, but in the sphere of individual and political rights it had to share the lot of the whole people, subject to the pleasure and often terribly cruel displeasure of the dictator. Ruthless terror made it as obedient and submissive to the will of the rulers as the nobility and gentry had previously been to an absolute czar and his barons. There has been, however, no lack within the ruling class of critical voices and even rebellion either in the medieval or in the Soviet system. And whenever the desire for change within the ruling class coincided with the changes striven for by the broad mass of the people, the criticism easily assumed the form of movements which have decisively influenced the development of human relations.

Simultaneously with the crystallization of the ruling class came a growth in size and development in characterization of the working class, whose ranks were swelled in the course of rapid industrialization. By the very nature of things, this class was becoming aware of its own separate interests and of the contradiction between official ideology and existing misery and tyranny. Intellectual opposition, arising within the privileged sections, found a stronger and stronger source of inspiration in the growing discontent and aspirations of the broad masses of the people. Even during Stalin's lifetime, a group of Soviet economists came forward with a demand for slowing down the accelerated accumulation of capital, and forced the dictator to reply with a warning that "if we were to follow the lead of these comrades, we should have to cease giving primacy to the production of means of production (capital goods) in favor of the production of consumer goods" (J. Stalin "Economic Problems of Socialism in the

U.S.S.R.," p. 28). It is obvious that the social and political sense of the criticism made by this "group of economists" was nothing other than an expression of the prevailing opinion that the consumption needs of the Soviet citizen should be satisfied. When, on another occasion, two Soviet economists—Venzher and Sanina—proposed the sale of the MTSs (the basic implements of agricultural production in the hands of the state and administered by the Machine and Tractor Stations) to the collective farms—which was also strongly condemned by Stalin (*ibid.* p. 101)—that proposal expressed the desire of the peasants to rid themselves of one of the irritating factors of state control.

Critical opinion of this kind during Stalin's lifetime was attacking the very basis of the Communist conception, and it must have met with a wide and favorable reception if Stalin decided that his personal intervention in the matter was necessary. It is quite possible that a purge no less ruthless and bloody than its predecessors would suppress for some time the pressure of critical thought, but Stalin's death must have freed it and forced his successors to make concessions and to initiate, partially at least, realization of the postulates put forward by those first revisionists of Communist ideology and practice.

1. De-Stalinisation

Despite the fact that mystery still surrounds the circumstances in which Stalin died at so convenient a time, and the circumstances in which a few individuals attempted to seize power, one can assume that those attempts did not bring success either to Beria or Malenkov, mainly because the preservation of a dictatorship by one individual and of the old system of ideological and political leadership could not be reconciled with a fully developed desire among the ruling class to share the power and to secure for themselves personal safety. Because of this, the group led by Khrushchev gained victory under the slogan of breaking with the past, at least in respect of the methods of autocracy and of the use of terror as a normal means of governing. This group, in seeking the support of the ruling class and the sympathy of the working masses, did not shirk from the risk of destroying the Stalinist legend and of unmasking the dictator's cruelties, wilfulness, shortsightedness and blunders.

The process of de-Stalinization (despite the fact that its range was confined to fighting against the "cult of the individual") signified a great victory for the revisionism which had developed within the ruling class. But the interests of this class were organically bound up with the new system. Khrushchev's and his group's revisionism meant a number of definite and important changes without undermining the basis of the system. The social and economic structure of Soviet society forms the foundation of ruling-class privileges, placing in its hands the management of the whole national economy; the preservation of the hierarchy created for this purpose depends on preventing the workers from having any say in management, which means that the basis of economic totalitarianism and dictatorship has remained intact.

Ideology Retained

"Revisionism from above" has also left intact the ideological structure of Communism. The conception of the proletarian dictatorship, understood as the dictatorship of the Communist mono-party; "democratic centralism," leaving in the hands of the party elite full initiative and control over the ideological life of the party; solidarity of the Communist bloc as opposed to the "cosmopolitan" ideal of international solidarity of the working people; economic totalitarianism securing supreme power for the ruling class—all these principles of the Communist conception, together with the phraseology of the transition from Socialism—which is said to have been attained—to Communism—which has to satisfy fully all the needs of the individual—have been retained. The departure, however, from Stalinist practices in the application of these principles—as, for example, reconsideration of the relationship between the production of capital and consumer goods so that now relatively more emphasis is placed on the latter; curbing of the power of the security police, and relaxation of police control over the private life of the citizen—has brought about far-reaching consequences. Larger supplies of consumer goods have benefited not only the privileged section of the community but also the common people. Lessening of the importance of the weapons of hunger and police terror has compelled the regime to look for support not only among the ruling class, but also among the mass of the population.

Increase in the prices paid by the State to the collective farms and to the peasants for agricultural products; dissolution of the machine and tractor stations and distribution of the implements to the collective farms; courting of the peasants, amounting at present to the recognition of the peasant form of agricultural production as almost equal to that of the collective system (such a move would never have been thought of, let alone conceded, by Stalin)—all these steps form links in a great revisionist process of the Stalinist system. A policy of raising real incomes and of shortening the obligatory working day, even if this policy does not in fact embrace all categories of workers, is also a significant sign of the new social and political situation in which the collective leadership, in contrast to Stalinist times, feels compelled to take steps designed, if not to win over, then at least to appease, the proletariat.

Structure Intact

This official revisionism, which was inaugurated from the top, is limited by the desire to leave intact the basis of Communist structure and ideology, and introduces changes only where they are required in the interest of the ruling class of the bureaucracy, is a long way from fulfilling the aspirations of the working masses. Because of this, critical thought during the last ten years has moved much further, examining the whole Communist conception formed during the Stalinist epoch, and seeking a way which would lead to the elimination of the basic contradiction between ideals and reality. The inspiration centres, revealed in the course of the Kolyma forced-labor camp revolt, by confessing that their action was motivated by a desire to return to Lenin's system as expounded in his original doctrine of social democracy, afforded yet another clear example that this trend of thought is rampant in the Soviet Union.

How deeply the revisionist trends have permeated Soviet society can be deduced from the Russian Communist Party's Central Committee resolutions in respect of the intensification and reorientation of Soviet propaganda, disclosed in 1960. These resolutions do not conceal that "whole groups of the population are, in fact, outside the ideological and political influence . . . at a time when the opponents of Communism are intensifying their propaganda for the capitalist way of life." Charges formulated

in this context against the Soviet propagandists that "they do not wage a sufficiently energetic war against a hostile ideology, and do not counter-act effectively the signs of nationalism, cosmopolitan leanings and apolitical attitudes" show without any disguise that the influence of criticism growing among the masses paralyses even the official organs of Soviet propaganda, i.e. the life-line of the Communist Party.

2. Nationalist Deviations

In the countries of so-called "people's democracy," Communist revisionism from the top has assumed a form and substance different from that which has developed in the U.S.S.R. This has been due to different political conditions, a different composition of social forces and the specific character of the Communist parties themselves. The peoples of these countries have retained a deep-rooted sense of their separate cultural and political traditions. Independent thought has remained alive despite many years of systematic terror. Social strata which had been established as separate entities for a long time were dismembered, dispersed, and overwhelmed by the wave of terror unleashed by the Communist regime. They remained, however, a vital national force; whereas the Communist parties, created not in the heat of revolution but by administrative decree and under pressure from government quarters, could neither become the backbone of a new ruling class nor protect themselves against the influence of a hostile environment.

In trying to establish contact with the people, party centres were compelled to depart from the policy of closely imitating Soviet patterns imposed upon them by the Kremlin managers. As a typical example of this, one can mention the history of the application in Poland of Soviet methods of maintaining work discipline. The introduction of a draconian act dealing with this matter was accompanied by a series of specially staged show trials of "trouble-makers" and "ring-leaders." The press gave wide publicity to the "criminals" and the consequences of their offences. The courts were filled with a multitude of workers. The effects of this campaign, however, were contrary to what the Communists had anticipated. Each such trial, instead of augmenting fear among workers—if not aversion towards the accused—was bringing them

closer together and was evoking from them full sympathy for the unfortunate victims, and signs of growing hostility towards the system that imposed severe punishments upon the working people who, as a result of appalling housing and transport conditions, and frequently due to the necessity of taking additional employment, were bound, now and again, to turn up late for their duties or make breaks in their normal employment. Consequently, the campaign had to be discontinued, and the powers provided by the Act exercised less frequently and much more cautiously.

Following "Own Roads"

Departures from Communist policy, without, of course, changing the fundamental line determined by Communism in the Soviet Union, varied considerably in the different countries of Central and Eastern Europe and were related directly to local conditions. The main objective of this policy, however, was clear: to create in each country living conditions similar to those in the U.S.S.R., and thereby to prepare the ground for a full union with the Soviet empire. But the vision of such an end, revealing itself through a large influx of Soviet instructors, supervisors and what not, was alarming to all the nations concerned, and increased their hostility to the governments—a hostility which in this respect was also shared by large majorities within the Communist parties themselves. Thus three years had hardly passed since the establishment of the Communist regime when, due to this anxiety and fear of Soviet imperialism, there emerged within the Communist parties a revisionist movement. This movement, inspired by feelings of patriotism, defied orders to follow faithfully all Soviet patterns and embarked on the venture of their respective "own roads to Socialism." The most powerful stimulus to this was the schism created by Tito's Yugoslavia.

Ignoring the personal aspects of Tito's revolt that initially played an important role, the substance of this revolt was to proclaim that each nation—even if ruled by Communists—has an inalienable right to determine its own ways of life and progress, and that Russian interference with the internal affairs of the various countries is a gross violation of this right. The success of Tito's revolt, which freed Yugoslavia from dependence on Moscow, was due to the fact that

it embodied the most real desires and aspirations of the whole people of Yugoslavia. Nests of similar revolt were found in all other countries. Signs of "nationalist deviations"—i.e. endeavors, even among the leadership of the various Communist parties, towards at least a certain degree of independence from the Soviet protectors—revealed themselves everywhere.

Stalin had enough power and authority to be able to deal with these trends in his own way. Show-trials took many Communist leaders of "people's democracies" to the gallows, or at best—as in the case of Gomułka—to prison. It turned out that in the long run the conception of "own (national) roads" (to Socialism) could not be upheld. The terrorized parties toed the line, but their members could never forget the ruthlessness with which their leaders of yesterday—in many cases highly respected by the idealists of the rank and file for their services to the cause of Communism—were removed from power and either executed or imprisoned. Trends of thought striving to secure from Moscow freedom of decision, at least in the field of internal affairs, did not die. They were inspired and nurtured by a general hostility of all nations towards Soviet "protection." Suppressed during Stalin's lifetime, they reappeared with far greater vigor and vitality after his death. The events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary demonstrated the strength and intensity of these trends.

Holding the Line

Threatened by complete disintegration, the Communist parties again had to place the question of their "own roads" at the head of their objectives. The conception of "own roads" became part and parcel of the official revisionist program. It was even embodied in the ruling Communist parties' general declaration, announced in 1957.

But this step of accepting the revisionist point of view, like the whole official process of de-Stalinization, did not, in fact, mean a break with the basic political and ideological line. The practical substance of "own roads" was limited to the indispensable concessions needed to appease the mounting anger of the people, and to a removal of the external signs of Moscow's control over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This could not satisfy either the particular nations—or the party members who

saw in a wide application of methods departing from the Soviet pattern the only way of strengthening their own position and influence. By adjusting the methods of governing, with a view to giving due consideration to the real structure of social relations, prevailing trends of opinion and the aspirations of the working class, the Communists saw a possibility of coming to terms with the governed societies and of extricating themselves from the situation in which both the government and the party were confronted everywhere with an attitude of determined hostility.

Substantial Changes

Revisionism from the top, approved by the leadership of the Communist movement, despite extreme caution adopted in the process of withdrawal from the Stalinist positions, brought substantial changes both in the ideology and in the practice of the Communist governments. Officially this movement found its expression in the above-mentioned 1957 declaration, which was signed by the Communist parties wielding dictatorial power in twelve countries. This declaration, which can be summarized in a few basic points, differs considerably in its tone and content from all previous declarations. The fundamental tenets of Communism were formulated in the famous 21-point declaration of 1920, which served at that time as a springboard for splitting the international labor movement. The main tenet stated that the workers could secure power only by revolutionary means and by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat; the declaration of 1957 proclaims that "it is now possible for the working class to secure power by means of parliamentary majorities." For tens of years it was held that the Soviet Union and its system of government were a pattern to be followed by all Communist parties. The declaration of the "Twelve" states the possibility of "revolution by peaceful means" and accepts that there are various ways of transition from capitalism to Socialism. According to the old precepts, all Communist parties had to bear a uniform name and had to obey, without any reservations, the Communist International. Now, many Communist parties camouflage their real character under such names as "united workers" or "socialist" parties; while instead of a centralized international, "conferences of the Communist and

the workers' parties are convened—when necessary—for the purpose of mutual information and consultation."

The revisionism initiated by Khrushchev, and by all other leaders of the Communist movement—who, as in the past, have toed the line chosen by their Soviet elder "brother"—preserves from the old ideological armory only those weapons which are indispensable for maintaining power and for the continuation of an imperial policy by the Soviet Union. This development, however, marks the end of an epoch in which the Communist movement boasted of its monolithic ideology, and opens wide the floodgates for critical thought, now liberated from the myth of the panacea value of the Russian Revolution and the infallibility of the Soviet Communist Party.

3. Between Dogmatism and Revision

The cult of the leader constituted an integral part of the Communist conception. The infallibility of the leader embodied the infallibility of the party, giving it thereby a guarantee of organizational and ideological uniformity. The abolition of the cult of the leader profoundly affected the whole structure of Communism.

The concept of "collective leadership" presents a completely different picture. The very basis of a collective body connotes a difference of views and opinions and consequently of checks and compromises. Theoretically, each point of view has the right to exist. The fact that Nikita Khrushchev has emerged as the head of the "collective leadership" and has gathered in his hands all the reins of power does not mean that he can ignore the views and opinions of his political environment. He has to strive for its cooperation and secure the support of its majority for his policies. He must patronize and promote some individuals and remove others from power: generally speaking, he must operate and control not only the mechanism of compulsion but also that of persuasion combined with compromise.

Undoubted political talent, and a great skill in the organizational manoeuvring within the party, have allowed Khrushchev to occupy the position of the first leader in the collective leadership (*primus inter pares*) and to remove from the political scene his most dangerous opponents. But the very fact that removal from power of his oppo-

nents has not been followed by their execution is sufficient evidence that today it is impossible, even in the Soviet Union, to re-enter the road chosen by Stalin. It is of little importance whether this development is in harmony with Khrushchev's will or is necessitated by circumstances. One must admit that he avoids posing as an "infallible" leader; he does not attempt to present himself as an ideological oracle, or to shut himself in an ivory tower of splendor and glory, isolated from his colleagues and subordinates; he even betrays a certain degree of contempt for ideologists and their theories and directs his whole attention doggedly towards the practical aspects of human, economic, administrative and political matters. In this respect, significant trends of thought can be found in the resolutions of the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee announced in January, 1950.

System Threatened

A transition from Stalinist theocracy to Khrushchev's absolutism fully satisfies the interests of the ruling class, which had emerged and grown during the period of Stalin's dictatorship but only recently gained a relative freedom of initiative and action. This latter fact is largely responsible for Khrushchev's success and the duration of his rule. His administration increases the importance of this class, widens the scope for its freedom and autonomy, gives it greater influence on the course of state affairs and strengthens in it awareness of the value of the service which it renders to Soviet society as a whole. But, at the same time, Khrushchev's regime destroys the conformist attitude of mind of the Soviet people, enslaved and disciplined under Stalin's rule. His regime no doubt opens new vistas for social development in all its aspects, and these vistas, in the opinion of many who were brought up in the old Communist school, are full of dangers to the very basis of the Soviet system.

A conservative attitude of mind is common not only among the citizens of democratic societies. People who occupied higher posts in the Stalinist hierarchy and felt convinced that that hierarchy was maintained by ruthless methods of terror and complete disregard for public opinion had good reason to fear changes initiated by the official revisionist trend. All further changes must appear to them as a gradual demolition of the whole system. This conservatism had

been so deep-seated among the ruling circles that Khrushchev, no doubt fully aware of the risk he was taking, had to resort to the measure of publicly denouncing the bloody tyranny of Stalin. To Communist conservatism this move dealt an almost lethal blow. But it also carried with it dangerous consequences for the whole Soviet system. Thus, immediately after the conservative camp had been disarmed, Khrushchev conciliated them by veiling his revelations of yesterday with the objective of a "fight against the cult of the individual." On this occasion he took pains to make it abundantly clear "that Stalin was guilty only of some blunders, and of the abuse of power in general, but that all this did not detract from his great services rendered during the process of building the Soviet Union."

Adherents of Communist conservatism now formed themselves permanently into a movement opposing Khrushchev's policy. This movement was given the name of "dogmatism." The removal from power of Malenkov, Molotov, Zuckov and Bulganin, and "relief" from key posts (both in the party and in the government) of hundreds (perhaps even thousands) of dignitaries of a lesser calibre, illustrate the mounting antagonisms and conflicts which arose as a result of the appearance within the party of the "dogmatist" movement. This tension assumes particular importance when the opposing sides begin to appeal to the opinion of the people. In this relentless struggle, fought on all fronts with great skill, cunning and age-long experience, Khrushchev holds the trump card of paramount importance: the "dogmatists" want a return to the epoch in which terror and fear, mass-imprisonment and forced labor camps were the universal rule. This trump card ensures the popularity of Khrushchev's administration. But the dogmatists, too, have in their arsenal plenty of arguments for waging a war of criticism.

Khrushchev goes, for example, to Yugoslavia and proclaims there, "urbi et orbi," that there are various roads to the building of Socialism. Is this not an act of humiliation in regard to Tito? Does it not imply toleration of the audacity and arrogance of the Poles, who expel from their country a marshal of the Red Army (Rokossovsky), re-introduce in agriculture a system of small-holdings, and move away from the Soviet pattern? Will not toleration of this kind eventually imperil the Communist system in the Soviet Union itself?

Khrushchev courts the peasants, lowers the targets in the cumulation of land, and by giving collective-farms (kolkhozes) equal rights with those enjoyed by state-farms (sovkhozes) he halts progress towards the highest form of agricultural production, based on the national ownership of land and mechanical equipment. Khrushchev introduces decentralization of the national economy and of the administrative machinery; grants wide powers to particular republics and regions; reshuffles the managerial class; removes to the remote regions of the country comrades of great merit who devote their lives to the cause of Communism, uprooting them from their families and the fields of activity to which they were accustomed. Does not all this lead to the intensifying of nationalist separatism, which debilitates the part played by ethnic Russia, often squandering in the process the most valuable individuals?

Each of these arguments finds in some quarters a favorable response, reviving sentiments of Pan-Russian patriotism, or reanimating the ideological premises instilled in party members by decades of intense indoctrination. The party leadership has, however, adequate means of defense against these attacks. Its economic plans surpass Stalin's both in scope and vigor; the rule of "priority for heavy industry" has been retained; the military power has been increased; and Soviet achievements in the field of modern arms, guided missiles and atomic weapons astonish the whole world. Khrushchev can parry attacks also by pointing out that though he compels many bureaucrats to leave their feather-bedded posts, he does *not* send them to prisons or camps but appoints them to equally important and even paid posts in the provinces. Even so, the revisionist policies of the present leadership in the U.S.S.R., and for that matter in the whole Communist bloc, must take into account the "dogmatist" movement, which is active in influential circles of the party and is always ready to topple opponents from power when suitable circumstances arise.

China in Background

This danger is even more serious because in the background of native Soviet conservatism looms China, which is in process of making her "great leap" analogous to Stalin's first five-year plan, requiring—as in the case of Soviet experiment—the utmost inten-

sification of terror and complete disregard for the human being.

The significance of China's support of the Soviet conservative camp extends far beyond the frontiers of ideological warfare and internal struggle between different schools of Communist planning. It becomes ever more evident that China appears in the arena of international politics as a rival of the Soviet Union. She gradually supplants Soviet agencies in the countries liberated from Western colonialism, and, by supporting Russian "dogmatists," she creates—on the pattern of Nazi Germany—her own "fifth column," or at least its embryo, in the very heart of the Soviet Union. At present Sino-Soviet friendship and cooperation are mutually indispensable: the powerful background formed by Communist China increases the importance of the U.S.S.R. as the leader of the whole Communist world, while Soviet economic aid to China constitutes the necessary condition for the rapid industrial progress of the Asian colossus and for its achievement thereby of the status of a real world power, strong in terms not only of population but also of productivity and wealth. In the not too distant future, however, an open conflict between the two Communist rivals may spark off, and then the faction of Stalinist dogmatism may become a Chinese party in a struggle against "the traitors of Communism."

These and other factors compel the present leadership of the U.S.S.R. to create and consolidate a wider basis of support for their power than that constituted by the Communist Party alone. Hence, for the first time in the history of Communism, one can observe notable changes of policy in favor of the ordinary citizen. Planners and policy-makers in every country throughout the Communist bloc are taking pains to show that their measures benefit not only the ruling class but also the working man. To this end, no effort is spared to improve housing conditions for all, to win the sympathy and cooperation of the collective-farm peasants, to raise the real income of the workers in general and even to shorten obligatory working hours. It is now more evident than ever that the necessary condition which will enable the present Communist administrations to fence off the potential danger created by the Stalinist conservative opposition within the Communist parties, to master the delicately balanced situation of today and to secure for themselves

a broader social basis of support, is, if not to win over the workers and the peasants, at least to obtain peace on this front.

Such concessions, and the benefits that official revisionism from the top can give, cannot, however, be sufficient to meet the awakened desires and aspirations of the broad social masses. These desires and aspirations take on an ever-increasing note of resolute endeavor towards a fundamental change in the social and political relations in countries under Communist rule. This revisionist movement comes from below, and its source and strength lie in the working people. It is a thorough revisionism of all the odious political, social and economic anomalies forced upon the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe during the Stalinist period. This revisionism repudiates not only Stalin but also his whole life's work.

SOCIALIST OPPOSITION

It has been a repeated theme of propaganda in the Communist countries to direct fervent appeals to the faithful, with a view to instructing and encouraging them to keep themselves immune from the influences of the bourgeois (capitalist) environment, to fight against capitalist ideology permeating the party ranks, and to keep ideological vigil against all trends of thought originating outside the party environment. Appeals of this kind might have some practical effect if the Communist parties were formed as organized entities completely isolated from their social environment. Such was, in fact, the organizational concept of Communism during the civil war in Bolshevik Russia, and at that time and during the period immediately after the civil war this concept was carried into effect. From the moment, however, that the party took on the form of mass organization and its membership reached millions, the insulating wall erected between the party and society crumbled away and disappeared. Appeals for a complete destruction of obsolete ways and forms in the field of thought and morals; strong condemnation of any tendency to accept the "capitalist way of life"; continued insistence that co-existence with capitalism does not mean a truce in the ideological warfare against that system—all these exhortations and warnings reveal but one simple truth: that after forty years of existence of the Soviet Communist Party, its members are more apt to be influenced by the non-party environment than that environment is likely to

be influenced by their own Communist views.

1. The Party and its Members

The Communist parties in the so-called "people's democracies" have never been able to protect their members adequately against the influences of their environment. The ranks of these parties were filled by people influenced by various motives. Those motivated by Communist ideals were fewest in number. It is true that many of the new party members were attracted by the actual political and social slogans, but it does not follow from this that they accepted the Communist doctrine and repudiated their former social and political radicalism. An equally large proportion was formed of opportunists who always and everywhere rally round those who have power. There was also no lack of upstarts quick to seize any opportunity offering rapid social and material advancement. A significant factor in this respect is the social composition of the Communist parties in the "people's democracies." The parties claimed to be workers' organizations; in fact, they were hives of functionaries (civil servants). It is self-evident that in such circumstances ideological uniformity and effective protection of party members against the influences of outside trends of thought were absolutely out of the question. Great efforts in the fields of propaganda and education could not materially change that situation. General and obligatory teaching of the principles of "Marxism-Leninism" amounted to learning by heart a few score formulae and using them skilfully on all sorts of public occasions or in discussion, leaving the party member's private views completely unaffected. This state of affairs was reflected in the attitude of the public towards the party and its members. The irreconcilable hostility of the public towards the party was extended only to a small part of its members, namely to the zealots. The average party member was for the most part regarded as a victim of circumstances, compelled to join the party by difficult conditions of life. According to a popular witty version, party members were divided into three groups: those who believed and practiced; those who believed and did not practice; and those who did not believe but practiced all party rules and instructions. In this farcical version, one can find reflected a picture of the real situation.

To the first group belong the people of strong and deep-rooted ideals who are convinced of their righteousness and are fanatically devoted to the cause of Communism; "the ends justify the means" is their motto—and they are ready to do anything to realize a Communist society. This group, formed originally by experienced Communists who had been reared in the period of illegal Communist existence in their native countries and of raging Stalinist terror in the Soviet Union, swelled its ranks by recruiting a number of new adherents from among the younger generation. It is this group which forms the hard core of the Communist party. Intellectually it is conservative and "dogmatically" minded, rather than disposed to explore the ways and means of adjusting the party's creed and policies to the needs of a changing society. This group looks upon contemporary society with ingrained contempt and suspicion and regards it as a seat of "bourgeois ideology."

New Type Communist?

Experience gained during the decades of Communist power in the U.S.S.R. and, still more, complete failure of Soviet patterns to produce expected results when applied to conditions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, helped to produce a new type of idealistically-minded Communist. He, too, is convinced of the righteousness of his ultimate ends but can see the gaping abyss between the ideals and the practices employed in translating them into reality. These people believe in Communism, but they have rejected the idea of realizing it by methods adopted by the Communist parties. The unmasking of Stalin's crimes swelled the number of this group and made it imperative for them to intensify their critical attitude towards Communism and to raise doubts as to the value and merit of its fundamental tenets. To this group belongs the greater part of the younger Communist generation, which was brought up in conditions of Communist ideological monopoly and intense indoctrination, the basis of which was the "Short History of the Bolshevik-Communist Party of All the Russias." In this section the revelations about Stalin crimes, it was admitted by one of its leading writers, wrought real havoc.

The third group comprises the mass of the party rank and file. Here one can find all kinds of people, ranging from well-organized and camouflaged teams of upstarts,

or career-men devoid of all moral scruples, to the ordinary innocent citizen. The former, in order to gain promotion and power, are ready to do everything required of them by their masters. They form a faithful and reliable guard of executors commanded by the top party leadership, and are regarded with universal contempt. The latter, trying to adjust themselves to existing circumstances, recognize in a half-hearted way the official creed and line, but are more or less clearly aware of the internal contradictions of Communism. Having decided to join the party for various motives—frequently from the urge to participate in public activities in order to contribute to the betterment of social conditions—this category of party members is eager to explore every idea and to exploit every possibility that may bring them closer to the people and eliminate the difference between officially proclaimed "Socialism" and Communist practice. People of this category form a large reservoir of support for revisionist endeavors to adjust Communist doctrine and policy.

A Micro-Society

None of the criteria customarily used to appraise the importance, influence and achievements of political parties in the free world can be applied in assessing similar characteristics of the Communist parties in the countries where they wield dictatorial power. There the party has become the central factor in the organization of the state and society. Any organized public or private action not approved by the party is out of the question. Even an individual social action is made if not impossible at least difficult. As soon as the scope of such action assumes wider significance, it clashes with party monopoly and is immediately suppressed. For this very reason, the fundamental principle of the existence of any political party—freedom of ideological choice—does not exist here. The Communist party has become in a sense a micro-society comprising in its ranks the active elements of all social strata and of all walks of life. Because of this structural peculiarity, these active social elements are compelled to accept the party membership card.

The author of this study has repeatedly heard old Socialists who joined the Communist party after its dictatorship had been established express a typical and striking justification of their action: "If I did not do this I should have to cut myself off from

all participation in active public life, and there is, after all, so much to be done here!"

Members Pawns

A party constituted in such a way precludes ideological unity. Unity of action is enforced and maintained by the application of the principle of "democratic centralism"—i.e., a system in which centralism of all decisions is the reality and the word "democratic" serves merely as an outward and popular dressing. In practice, this democratic centralism means that lesser authorities accept the decisions of higher authorities, which amounts in reality to accepting decisions of the central authorities. In Stalin's lifetime, such a "democratic" system of decision-making was considered the best means of preparing for world revolution. A party member who doubted their fairness or soundness, and who suffered from gross injustice or saw its effects on others, could only feel himself to be an insignificant pawn pushed to and fro by a wise hand on the chessboard of history. Koestler's reference to the relations between "nil and infinity" expresses the substance of this relationship between the individual member and the party and its leadership.

Under such conditions, individual revolts ended at the very least in a sense of personal ideological bankruptcy, which caused dissociation from all ideologies and retirement into the seclusion of private life, or frequently a crossing over to the opposite camp, which opposed Communism with kindred totalitarian principles and methods. The memoirs of an American writer and zealous member of the American Communist Party—Howard Fast—show in full the psychological state of a rebellious Communist, trained to feel contempt for all that is outside the Communist movement, and imbued with hatred above all for the labor movement independent of Communism. These memoirs confirm that a believing Communist, when he breaks with Communism, becomes valueless. In the non-Communist world he can see only hopeless indifference and inertia, a blind submission of the social masses; or feel an unwavering hostility towards all that once constituted the essence of his ideological life.

A completely different state of affairs has arisen since the working class in the Communist countries reappeared in the public arena. Its opposition to Communist prac-

tices has demonstrated that the departures of Communism from the ideas represented in our epoch by the working-class movement in no way means that these ideas have lost their historical significance, determining the future of mankind.

The revolt of an idealistically-minded Communist found its counterpart in the revolt of the working class against Communist practices. From the moment the latter type of revolt arose, a breach with Communism did not have to mean a breach with Socialist ideology; on the contrary, for many Communists it became synonymous with the act of identifying themselves with the working class, which continued its struggle for the attainment of its ideals in the field of organized social life.

2. Opposition from Below

Revisionism from above saved the Communist parties from the grave crisis following Stalin's death, the tumbling of the cult of the leader, and the coming to light of the detachment which existed between the parties and the working masses. Announcement of a new policy by the leadership of the main Communist parties—first of all in the U.S.S.R. and Poland—reduced for some time the mounting differences within particular parties. Announcement that the party was able to rectify its mistakes and to move along right lines in the future met with a wide and often enthusiastic response. It soon became apparent that official revisionism did not intend to go beyond a number of unavoidable concessions, and that, contrary to all expectations, it concentrated all its efforts on upholding the existing system by patching up only its most glaringly visible flaws. Thus all strains of opinion which viewed the party policy with a critical eye found themselves in a common front against the "conservative" wing of the party. In conceiving and interpreting the extent of revisionism in relation to both the past and the future, the leadership parted ways with the strong progressive movement which emerged within wide party circles and found a most welcome response among the working masses. The struggle was inevitable. The party leadership took up the challenge and at the same time branded as "revisionism" everything that aimed at radical changes in the ideology and methods of the Communist movement.

In normal conditions of political freedom, a campaign against revisionists would end

either by expulsion of their representatives and adherents from the ranks or by the revisionists' themselves leaving the party. This has happened only in isolated cases. Appeals from the party leadership's ideologists to revisionists to come forward courageously and leave the party ranks, as well as their references to the party right to expel from its ranks people who were not in agreement with its policies, sounded too hypocritical, and even too provocative, to have a mass effect. The party did not cease to be a monopolistic state institution; it made impossible all attempts to restore independence to the labor movement. "Revisionism" consequently remained as a hidden opposition within the party, camouflaged by external signs of loyalty; but its ideological influence affected large circles of party members. As a result, a bitter party campaign was launched against revisionism, which established itself as a permanent opposition front, having a potential for development while awaiting an opportune moment to reveal itself as a mass movement with a definite ideological and political program.

Opposition Spreads

It is difficult to establish the exact date of the emergence of this basic opposition movement from the very heart of Communism. Crystallization of the movement began during the Stalinist period. University youth deported to the Klyma forced-labor camp not only took with them the embryo of ideological conceptions but also attempted organized action under the slogan of purifying Communism from the degenerations of the Stalinist epoch. The names which were adopted by these "true Leninists" or "syndicalists" were indicative of strong tendencies to return to Socialist ideas in their classical form. A colorful picture of ideological tendencies was revealed during the revolutionary upsurge in Poland and Hungary in 1956. This spoke of the spontaneous movement of intellectual protest, as well as of the unfinished process of each nation's endeavoring to create its own comprehensive conception of a political program. Lack of such a comprehensive conception enabled the party leadership in Poland to exploit fully the dynamic opposition to Stalinist conservatism and to halt the train of events by stepping in with the official revisionism of Gomulka.

Even today it is difficult to speak of the uniform ideological character of that "revisionism"

which is so relentlessly opposed by all Communist parties. Only one thing is certain—this movement is concerned with the most important problems arising from Communist ideology and practice. A full picture of the opposition movement born within the Communist movement can be found in Polish journalism during the period 1956-7, in the acts and program declarations of the Hungarian revolution, as well as in the works of a number of writers in other Communist countries whose voice managed to pass through the tightly-woven network of censorship. Despite differences in the situation in the various countries under Communist rule, all signs of opposition to the regime illustrate the same trend and character, and frequently even the same formulation of views and objectives, although—for obvious reasons—the emphasis placed on particular aspects of the changes striven for differs from one country to another. Let us begin a survey of the ideas represented by the opposition with a fundamental question for the policy of each Communist party except that of the Soviet Union: what are the possibilities and the limits of choice of their "own roads to Socialism" suited to the needs and conditions of the particular countries?

Stalin put the matter in a concise and straightforward way. Speaking on one occasion to Djilas, he stated: "In a modern war the victor will impose his system; this did not happen in previous wars . . ." This remark indicated that Communism, and the Soviet system, would be carried into other countries by the Red Army and established there under its protection; there would be no hesitation in imposing this system everywhere strictly according to the Soviet pattern. For a Communist, such a development was final and not to be a subject for discussion. However, three years after it had been launched, Stalin's policy of force met with complete disaster in Yugoslavia. The process of imposing Soviet patterns clashed with separate national interests and the desire for the right to solve their own national problems independently. A few more years elapsed, and the policy of "imposing the Soviet system upon others" was replaced by an officially proclaimed recognition of the principle of "own roads to Socialism" and respect for national independence.

But as in many other fields where, acting under pressure from Moscow, official revisionism curtailed the range of initially-promised changes, so in the field of "own road

to Socialism." It, too, has endeavored as far as possible to shunt everything on to a track of purely normal change. The simple truth is that it is impossible for the leadership in the Communist countries to launch and to proceed with the idea of their "own roads" and at the same time to adhere to a line of policy which aims at preparing their countries for an eventual union with the U.S.S.R. It is interesting to note that—despite much talk about national independence, complete freedom of initiative enjoyed by the various Communist parties, and so on—the concept of a "Socialist Commonweal" is again being pushed forward as the main objective of the Communist bloc. The same Gomulka who, by expelling from Poland the Soviet viceroy, Rokossovsky, became the symbol of regaining the right to "own national road to Socialism," misses no opportunity to speak about this "Commonweal." In its initial stage, the "Socialist Commonweal" is given concrete shape in the form of a supranational organ called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the object of which is to harmonize various national economic plans and to bind the countries of "people's democracy" into one economic system with the Soviet Union. The effect of this policy is simple: none of the member countries is in a position to resist any demands put forward by Moscow, since economically it is completely dependent on the Soviet Union. If, for example, Russia stops the supply of cotton to Poland, in a week to ten days nearly one million workers in the Polish textile industry will be unemployed. This applies also to the Polish iron and steel industry. It is therefore obvious that in this way the "own road" has been reduced to a very narrow footpath. The "Commonweal of Socialist Countries" is becoming synonymous with their complete dependence on the Soviet Union, which, to put it politely, is the strongest partner in this association.

The second instrument for exercising full Soviet control over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and maintaining an imposed Communist system is the Warsaw Pact for defense and the principle of complete solidarity in the Communist bloc. In this field the supreme power of the U.S.S.R. appears without any disguise. Representatives of the various "people's democracies" appear in the international arena as marionettes, entering and leaving it according to the needs of Soviet diplomacy. The "Common-

weal" which is being created by means of the COMECON and is bound by the provisions of a military alliance is in practice nothing but the realization—at a slower pace—of the Stalinist formula.

Opposition groups within the Communist movement draw from these facts the appropriate conclusions. They press for a policy of multilateral economic and trade relations with both East and West and a break with the policy of military alliances of all kinds. These demands were fully demonstrated during the revolutionary upsurge of 1956, and are systematically expressed in the foreign economic policy of Communist Yugoslavia. This attitude in no way implies a break, or even a relaxation, of economic co-operation either between a particular "people's democracy" and the Soviet Union, or between any countries within the Communist bloc. In fact, all it asks for is an international market situation in which freedom is retained to choose partners who offer terms best suited to the needs and interests of the particular country. If these attitudes meet with the most stubborn opposition from the Communist ruling groups, this only confirms the latter's compliance with the demands of Soviet centralism.

Aims of "Own Roads"

The conception of "own roads" meant, for the Communist countries, obtaining not only economic and political freedom but also the opportunity to free themselves from the painful duty of following Soviet patterns in the reshaping of their internal social and economic relationships. In the course of the revolutionary events of 1956, three basic objectives pushed themselves to the forefront in this respect:

- (1) a break with economic totalitarianism;
- (2) freedom of action and organization for the working class;
- (3) freedom for peasants from the threat of being compulsorily incorporated into the framework of an agricultural system based on collective farms.

The direction of changes was thus fixed. Certain changes have in this respect been realized not only in Yugoslavia but also in Poland. A more liberal attitude has been adopted towards the small private form of production; the institution of workers'

councils by general ballot has been introduced; and the peasants have secured the right to retain their individual holdings. These changes constitute a turning-point in the economic and social relationships of the Communist world. But the ruling groups are now sparing no effort to strip these achievements of their real significance. The new economic model (i.e., new economic policy) which, the internal opposition insisted, should be formulated and implemented as soon as possible, never progressed beyond the discussion stage in Poland, and recently even discussion of this question has been discontinued. Workers' councils have been subjected to party control, and their power has been reduced. Peasant small holdings are tolerated from necessity rather than recognized as a sector of agricultural production equal in importance to that of the collective farms, and the possibility of a return to thorough collectivization still exists. These trends clearly indicate that the opposition in the Communist countries has a wide field for action.

Focus for Action

The Communist opposition has concentrated its attacks on problems of fundamental importance to all sections of the community—that is, national independence and freedom from the necessity of blindly following Soviet patterns that bring general pauperization upon the people. This does not mean, however, that critical thought, once hatched in the Communist ranks, has not penetrated more deeply into the very foundations of the Communist ideological conception, which constitutes a negation of democracy. An attack on this vulnerable spot requires great intellectual courage, as it gravely endangers the Communists' retention of power by creating conditions for a reaction upsurge incalculable in its consequences.

Official revisionism of the new ruling group in the U.S.S.R., and still more so in Poland, has concentrated its attention on a theoretical rehabilitation of democracy. Stalinist contempt for democratic aspirations and endeavors was supplanted by a phraseology which proclaimed a continuous democratization of relationships under Communist power. Official action, however, was based upon the maxim that the realisation of democracy must be spread over the lifetime of many generations. One of the Communist theorists, in displaying his liberal

leanings, thus defined democracy: "...of course, democracy is a desirable thing, but only such a one as to ensure continuity of dictatorship." Other Communist thinkers have found pleasure in searching for differences between particular forms of democracy and lost themselves in the labyrinth of scholastic definitions of "Socialist", "people's", "bourgeois", and other kinds of democracy. However, there were also clear formulations which fundamentally opposed the idea of the party dictatorship and its monopoly in the field of political organization. In this respect the voice of the Hungarian revolution acquired paramount importance. The Communists who took part in it held the view that all parties that accepted the economic and social changes effected in the preceding period should have the right of legal existence. They were also in favor of the introduction of parliamentary democracy and of full freedom for the trade union movement, completely independent of control by either the government or any political party.

3. Reorientation towards Democratic Socialism

The leadership of the Communist block recognises "revisionism" as the greatest danger at present, and identifies "revisionists" with Social Democracy. No doubt they have strong grounds for anxiety and for attributing to "revisionism" a relationship with the Socialist movement. The left-wing opposition within the Communist movement constitutes an undeniable sign of ideological reorientation towards the classical principles of Socialism. This analysis shows a large range of views which are close to, and frequently identical with, the Socialist viewpoint as regards the pattern of relationships in the countries of "people's democracy". In a searching discussion of the particular problems involved, some differences—maybe even important differences—would no doubt emerge, but the basic line is common to both sides.

Leszek Kolakowski, the most prominent representative of Polish "revisionism", published, during the period of relative freedom of expression, a short work in which changes in the trend of thought within the Communist movement are depicted in the passage quoted below: (it should perhaps be added that the viewpoint expressed in this passage is accepted by most Polish Socialists).

New Hopes

"A search for ways to secure democratic forms of life by institutional means; a conviction that if the holders of political power are not subject to permanent, organised social control, and consequently subject to criticism and periodical replacement, they will inevitably, because of the weaknesses of human nature, degenerate into irresponsible despots and autocrats . . . ; that economic democracy is threatened by rotting if it is not accompanied by political democracy; that under the conditions of nationalised means of production it is necessary to struggle for their socialization; that free discussion and freedom of speech for ideological movements which accept the principles of Socialism are indispensable; that a political party degenerates if it is merged with the governing apparatus into one and the same organ. . . ; that democracy is a risk which is worth while taking, and is always a lesser risk than despotism, for despotism spells death to Socialist principles of government and augurs little hope of permanence; that Stalinism was not a 'mistake' but a totalitarian system in political, economic and cultural respects. . . ; that the curbing of political reaction can be brought about only by adjusting the whole system of government to the real rhythm of political life in the country, and not by periodic—and periodically necessary—police measures, for by the latter policy we shall be creating in our country social layers of explosive material; that the sovereignty of Poland has not ceased to be a vital problem; that the frequently practiced opposing of bourgeois democracy with the concept of Socialist democracy is injurious nonsense, as our objective is not to destroy the achievements of bourgeois democracy but to enlarge and build upon them. . . ; that democracy cannot be delayed until society has reached a high degree of political consciousness, because a high degree of political consciousness cannot be attained in any conditions other than democratic conditions of life; that the rule of the people is not at all guaranteed automatically by the state's proclaiming itself to be the exponent of the people's will and the Communist party as an emanation of the working class; that instead it (the rule of the

people) requires a continuous creation of institutional forms whereby the participation of the working people in the political and economic management of their country will be widened and strengthened . . ."

Wide Perspectives

This formulation of views reflects the ideological trend which develops within the ranks of the Communist camp, and relates to the decades of experience of the working-class struggle under Socialist banners. Expressed firmly in Poland; proclaimed in outline during the Hungarian uprising; contained, with a considerable similarity of thought, in Harich's declaration in East Germany; easy to find in a more or less concealed form in the Kolyma revolt in the Soviet Union—the leading ideas of this trend, one can assume, permeate the Communist camp in all countries where it rules. And in this case, one can also assume that they belong not only to a few individuals but also to vast numbers of the working people. This development is therefore of immense importance. By demonstrating beyond any doubt the unwavering attachment of the working masses first of all to Socialist ideals, it opens wide perspectives for man's place in society.

It does not seem likely that Communist propaganda, even when intensified to the utmost, can overcome this ideological trend. It is threatened, however, by one serious danger. This danger is that it will confine itself to scattered clandestine groups and limit its vitality to a purely intellectual opposition, which will be haunted by the fear that, on the one hand, attacking the positions of "revisionism from the top" will increase the danger of a return to the Stalinist epoch and facilitate thereby the triumph of the Communist conservatism, and, on the other hand, that any major disturbance or revolt could be exploited by the forces of political and social reaction. Both arguments play an important part in the official propaganda campaign against the "revisionist movement." For this reason, efforts towards the formulation of a joint ideological and political program uniting the Communist opposition movement with the Socialist movement suggests itself as an urgent necessity. By giving expression in this way to the aspirations of an overwhelming majority of politically conscious workers and intellectual

workers, it is possible and necessary to create a strong force which will render impossible both triumph of Communist dogmatism and

emergence of the elements of capitalist restoration. This force will open the way to the realization of democratic Socialism.

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